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Current Developments Under 9
UCC - Article
By Roy L. STmIEIimm, JR.
Scope of Article 9
As you will recall, Article 9 states that
it applies to all secured transactions in-
volving "personal property" which in-
cludes much more than just goods. The
term "personal property" also includes
accounts, contract rights, general intan-
gibles, chattel paper, instruments and
documents. We must comply with Article
9 when creating security interests in any
of these items. Several interesting cases
have come along to emphasize the pit-
falls which may snare those who are not
sensitive to the broad spectrum of trans-
actions covered by Article 9.
One type of problem which can arise
is illustrated by Jacobs v. Northeastern
Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A. 2d 49 (1965)
and U.S. v. Fleetwood, 165 F. Supp.
723 (D.C. Pa. 1958). Section 400.9-102
of the Code provides that Article 9 ap-
plies to "security interests created by
contract" including "any transaction (re-
gardless of its form) which is intended
to create a security interest in . . . con-
tract rights." With this in mind, con-
sider the position of a surety which fur-
nishes a performance or a payment bond
covering the contractor on a construction
project. If the contractor becomes insol-
vent and fails to complete performance
or to pay the claims of laborers and ma-
terialmen, the surety must put up the
money under its bond. Having done so,
the surety would like to lay claim to
any "drag" monies which may still be
owing on the construction project to the
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insolvent contractor. But the representa-
tive of the insolvent contractor will ob-
ject to this as preferential treatment of
the surety over other creditors of the
insolvent contractor. One way around
this objection would be for the surety
to claim that the contractor had assigned
to the surety his rights to payment under
the construction contract to the extent
necessary to cover any advances made
by the surety. But is such an assignment
of contract rights one intended for se-
curity so that we have an Article 9 se-
cured transaction? The court in U.S. v.
Fleetwood so held and since the surety
had not filed a financing statement to
perfect his security interest in the con-
tract rights, the trustee in bankruptcy
prevailed. One might conjecture as to
why no reference was made in this case
to Section 400.9-302(1) (e) which pro-
vides for automatic perfection of a se-
curity interest in "an assignment of ...
contract rights which does not alone or
in conjunction with other assignments to
the same assignee transfer a significant
part of the outstanding . . . contract
rights of the assignor." Perhaps the safe-
ty valve provided by this section could
have been appropriately used by the
surety in this case. Another approach
which the surety could use is to rely on
subrogation doctrines claiming the right
to be subrogated to the insolvent con-
tractor's claim to the payments still due
under the construction contract. Article
9 applies only to security interests "cre-
ated by contract" and rights of subroga-
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tion are created by law to avoid injustice
and are not consensual in nature. Under
this analysis it would seem that we do
not have a secured transaction which is
subject to Article 9. This is the substance
of the holding by the majority of the
court in Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp.
These cases certainly demonstrate the
careful attention which must be given
to the pervasive coverage of Article 9.
In re Ljosheim, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 46
(D.C. Cal. 1967) further emphasizes the
need for care in matters relating to as-
signment of contract rights. Here an at-
torney had taken an assignment of his
client's claim to an income tax refund
as security for attorney's fees. When the
client became bankrupt, it was held that
the trustee in bankruptcy took priority
over the attorney's claim to the income
tax refund because this transaction in-
volved an assignment of contract rights
which should have been perfected by
filing a financing statement. Some might
be inclined to question .whether a claim
to an income tax refund is a "contract
right" (Sections 400.9-106 and 400.1-201
(11)). Some might wonder whether the
safety valve provided by Section 400.9-
302 (1) (e) could have saved the assign-
ment from the clutches of the trustee in
bankruptcy.
Further with regard to the scope of
Article 9, it has been held that assign-
mqnt of a tort claim is not a secured
transaction subject to Article 9. Ark-
wright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bargain City
U.S.A., 251 F. Supp. 221 (D.C. Pa. 1967)
aff'd 373 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1967). A
liquor permit is a "general intangible"
(Section 400.9-106) which can be the
subject of a security interest under Ar-
ticle 9. Paramount Fin. Co. v. U.S., 379
F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1967). The coin col-
lection of a numismatist is "goods" (Sec-
tion 400.9-105(1) (f)) which can be the
subject of a security interest under Ar-
ticle 9. In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F.Supp.
193 (D.C. Mo. 1967).
The Code treatment of consignment
arrangements deserves some comment
since it represents a potential trap for
the unwary as indicated by several recent
cases. Section 400.9-102 says that Article
9 applies to "any transaction (regardless
of its form) which is intendd to create
a security interest in personal property"
and, more specifically, to "security inter-
ests created by contract including . . .
consignment intended as security." Sec-
tion 400.1-201(37) says that "[ulnless a
* . . consignment is intended as security,
reservation of title thereunder is not a
'security interest.'" Much of the purpose
in attempting to draw fine lines of dis-
tinction between consignments which are
intended for security and those which
are not is frustrated, however, by the
further provision in Section 400.1-201
(37) that "a consignment is in any event
subject to the provisions on consignment
sales" in Section 400.2-326. When we
look at this section, we find that goods
delivered on consignment are "deemed
to be on sale or return" and that goods
held on sale or return are subject to the
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claims of consignee's creditors. But the
consigned goods can be protected from
this awful fate if the consignor does one
of the three things suggested in Section
400.2-326(3). The first alternative---com-
plying with any applicable, sign-posting
law-is available only in those few states
which have enacted such laws as the
consignor learned to his sorrow in In
re Doumtown Drugstores, 3 UCC Rep.
Serv. 27 (D.C. Pa. 1965). The second al-
ternative should be regarded primarily as
an escape hatch to be used only as a last
resort. It will not apparently be easy
under this alternative to establish that
the consignee is "generally known to his
creditors to be substantially engaged in
selling the goods of others" as is indi-
cated by General Electric Co. v. Pettin-
gill Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199
N.E.2d 326 (1964). This leaves us with
the third alternative-comply with the
filing provisions of Article 9. So when all
is said and done, the only sensible course
in most situations is to treat the consign-
ment arrangement as a secured transac-
tion and comply with Article 9.
As to leases, again the provisions of
Section 400.9-102 are our starting point.
From these provisions we see that a lease
will be subject to Article 9 only if it is
"intended to -create a security interest."
This leaves us with the age-old problem
of the distinction between "pure" leases
and leases which are really security
agreements. But the Code does try to
give us a little guidance on this problem.
Section 400.1-201(37) provides that
"[w]hether a lease is intended as security
is to be determined by the facts of each
case." This generalization is of little help.
But there is more. It is further provided
that "the inclusion of' an option to pur-
chase does not of itself make the lease
one intended for security." It does not
follow from this provision that a lease
is a "pure" lease simply because refer-
ence to an option to purchase is omitted.
The solution to the problem is not this
simple as is indicated by In re Transcon-
tinental Industries, 3 UCC Rep. Serv.
235 (D.C. Ga. 1965). In this case United
States Leasing Corporation argued that
its leases were "pure" leases because
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they did not contain options to purchase..
The referee, however, pointed out that
the Code makes the distinction between
"pure" leases and leases intended as se-
curity depend on all of the facts of each
,case. Since United States Leasing Cor-
poration was essentially engaged in fi-
nancing the acquisition of goods by
lessees who were permitted to keep the
goods at the end of the lease term de-
spite the fact that there was no option
to purchase, the referee found that the
leases were intended as security. Section
400.1-201(37) further provides that "an
agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall be-
come or has the option to become the
owner of the property for no additional
consideration or for a nominal consider-
ation does make the lease one intended
for security." This raises the problem of
what is a "nominal consideration." Just
any kind of balloon payment at the end
of the lease term won't solve the prob-
lem. The payment should be related to
the actual value of the goods at the end
of the lease term. In re Washington Proc-
essing Co., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 475 (D.C.
Cal; 1966) and In re Wheatland Electric
Products Co., 237 F. Supp. 820 (D.C.
Pa. 1964).
Removal From the State
Of Goods Subject to a Perfected
Security Interest
. Section 400.9-103 (3) deals with prob-
lems of perfection when goods are moved
from one state to another. For example,
assume a security interest in goods is
perfected in Missouri and then the goods
are moved to Kansas. This section says
that the Missouri perfection continues
effective for four months after removal
of the goods to Kansas. At the end of
the four-month period, the security in-
terest becomes unperfected unless appro-
priate action is taken in Kansas within
the four-month period to continue the
perfection. Now suppose nothing is done
in Kansas to continue perfection beyond
the four-month period. If a bona fide
purchaser purchases the goods from the
debtor in Kansas six months after re-
moval, he obviously should prevail over
the security interest of the secured party
on which the perfection had lapsed at
the time of purchase (Section 400.9-301
(1)(c)). But suppose the bona fide
purchaser purchases within the four-
month period while the Missouri perfec-
tion is still effective in Kansas. Normally
a perfected security interest will prevail
over a bona fide purchaser and our bona
fide purrhaser will lose (Section 400.9-
301(1) (c)) unless the fact that the se-
cured party has allowed his perfection
to lapse subsequent to, the purchase af-
fects the result. The courts have held
that the rights of the parties are fixed
and determined as of the time of pur-
chase and are not affected by subsequent
events. So our bona fide purchaser loses
in this situation. Thus substantial rights
depend on the accident of whether the
purchase takes place before or after ex-
piration of the four-month period. First
Nat. Bank of Bay Shore v. Stamper, 93
N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (Super.
Ct. N.J. 1966); Al Maroone Ford v. Man-
heim Auto Auction, 205 Pa: Super. 154,
.208 A.2d 290 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1965).
Compare the provisions of Section 400.9-
312(4) where failure of the secured par-
ty to file within the ten-day period de-
prives him of purchase money priority
status even as to interests which inter-
vened before the ten-day period had ex-
pired.
The four-month limitation on perfec-
tion after goods are removed from the
state does not apply if perfection is ac-
complished by notation of the security
interest on a certificate of title as in the
case of motor vehicles (Section 400.9-
103(4)). Apparently the perfection by
notation continues effective after remov-
al to another state so long as the certifi-
cate of title bearing the notation remains
in force and effect. In re White, 266 F.
Supp. 863 (D.C. N.Y. 1967).
The Security Agreement
Except for pledge transactions, a writ-
ten security agreement is necessary to
create a security interest (Section 400.9-
203). In several cases where the secured
party was caught short, it has been ar-
gued that the financing statement fulfills
the requirement of a written security
agreement. This argument has been con-
sistently rejected. Mid-Eastern Electron-
ics v. First Nat. Bank, 380 F.2d 355 (4th
Cir. 1967); American Card Co. v. H.M.H.
Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963). As
the Code stands these cases 'seem "to be
correct. Section 400.9-105 (1) (h) defines"security agreement" as "an agreement
[defined in Section 400.1-201(3)] which
creates or provides for a security inter-
est." The contents of a financing state-
ment don't meet the demands of this
definition (Section 400.9-402). Nor will
notation of a lien on the certificate of
title for a vehicle (In re Nipper, 3 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1178 (D.C. Ore. 1966)) or
the retention of the certificate of title
by the secured party (McDonald v. Peo-
ples Automobile Loan & Fin., 115 Ga.
App. 483, 154 S.E.2d 886 (Ct. App. Ga.
1967)) be an acceptable substitute for
a written security agreement.
As to adequacy of description of the
collateral in the security agreement, the
Code'seems to be accomplishing its in-
tended result of eliminating high techni-
cality. In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC Rep.
Serv. 160 (D.C. Pa. 1964). But care
must be exercised to be sure you have
described each type of collateral which
is involved in the transaction. In U.S. v.
Antenna Systems, Inc., 251 F. Supp.
1013, (D.C. N.H. 1966) the collateral
was described as "all furniture, fixtures
and equipment" of the debtor. The court
held that this description did not include
engineering blueprints and technical data
developed by debtor's engineers because
such items were "general intangibles"
rather than "goods."
The Code seems to have given new
life to the waiver of defense clause when
inserted in an installment sale security
agreement covering equipment. Section
400.9-206 contemplates that such a
clause shall be given full force and ef-
fect in equipment financing and in Beam
v. John Deere Co., 240 Ark. 98, 398
S.W.2d 218 (1966) the court so held.
A pair of cases (In re Dorset Steel
Equipment Co. and In re Elkins-Dell
Mfg. Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (D.C. Pa.
1965)) have raised the issue of uncon-
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scionability of a security agreement. As
might be expected when this issue is
raised, the courts are apparently going
to be guided by the provisions of Sec-
tion 400.2-302 dealing with unc6nscion-
ability of sale -contracts.
In re United Thrift Stores, 363 F.2d
11 (3rd Cir. -1966) confirms the fact
that Section 400.9-205 has destroyed
the questionable but pertinacious doc-
trine of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925).
The Financing Statement
Problems usually arise in this area be-
cause of carelessness in the preparation
of the financing statement by your cli-
ents. The Code recognizes that mechan-
ical mistakes will inevitably be made in
the preparation of financing statements.
Section 400.9-402(5) provides that a
"financing statement substantially com-
plying with the requirements of this sec-
tion is effective even though it contains
minor errors which are not seriously mis-
leading." I am happy to report that the
courts have embraced this philosophy
wholeheartedly. To many of you this will
be a refreshing change. Now let's take
a look at some of the errors which have
triggered litigation.
First, the requirement of signature of
the secured party on the financing state-
ment (Section 400.9-402(1)). I would
note in passing that some might prop-
erly question whether the Code should
have required the signature of the se-
cured party on the financing statement.
It seems to serve little useful purpose. It
is interesting, however, that the courts
have not attempted to solve problems
arising out of the secured party's signa-
ture by calling them "minor errors." In-
stead the courts have turned to. the defi-
nition of "signed" (Section 400.1-201
(39)) which makes "any symbol exe-
cuted or adopted by a party" operate
as his signature. Under this definition
the courts have been willing to find that
if the secured party's name appears any-
where in the financing statement it will
operate as his signature: Plemens v. Did-
de-Glaser, Inc., 244 Md. 556, 224 A.2d
464 (Ct. App. Md. 1966); In re Hor-
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vath, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 624 (D.C. Conn.
1963); Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d
120 (2nd Cir. 1965). This approach is
commendable and is in keeping with
the -spirit of the Code which abhors
pointless technicality.
Another requirement of Section 400.9-
402(1) is that the secured party's ad-
dress must appear in the financing state-
ment. This requirement also seems to
serve little useful purpose for nowhere
in Article 9 is a third party given the
right to demand information directly
from the secured party. Only the debtor
can demand information from the se-
cured party and he should know where
to find the secured party without resort
to the address in the financing statement.
Can it be said that omission of secured
party's address is a "minor error"? The
New Mexico Supreme Court, in what
seems to me to be a questionable opinion,
has said "no." Strevell-Paterson Finance
Co. v. May, 77 N.M. 331, 422 P.2d 366
(1967).
When it comes to the requirement of
debtor's signature on the financing state-
ment, we have a different problem. Ob-
viously debtor's signature on a financing
statement is essential and the courts
should not be -charitable in tolerating
errors. In re Causer's Town and Country
Supermarket, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 541
(D.C. Ohio 1965) properly held that
omission of the debtor's signature on the
financing statement was fatal to perfec-
tion.
The requirement in Section 400.9-402
(1) that the financing statement must
state the name of the debtor can raise
some interesting problems. What is to be
done if the debtor's name is not cor-
rectly phrased or spelled in the financing
statement? Is this "minor error" which
should be excused? Improper spelling of
the debtor's name can lead to improper
indexing of the financing statement
which in turn can lead to a person being
misled when a search of the records is
made. If a third party has actually been
misled in his search of the records, it
would seem that the errors in debtor's
name are not "minor errors" for they
have actually been seriously misleading
and they should not be excused under
Section 400.9-402(5). But suppose thaf
the third party raising the issue of the
errors in debtor's name has not made a
search of the records so that the error
did not actually. mislead him. Isn't such
a party opportunistically relying on sheer
technicality to frustrate the transaction
and to gain an advantage? If so, shouldn't
a court hold that the errors were "minor"
and "not seriously misleading"? There is
some indication that the courts may ap-
proach the problem in this fashion. In
re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2nd
Cir. 1965); Matter of Vaughan, 4 UCC
Rep. Serv. 61 (D.C. Mich. 1967); In re
Bengtson, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 283 (D.C.
Conn. 1965).
Perfection of the Security Interest
Filing of a financing statement is un-
doubtedly the commonest method used to
perfect a security interest. Several mat-
ters should be mentioned regarding this
method of perfection. Remember that the
Code adopts the notice filing concept.
The security agreement itself never is
required to be filed. All that is required
to be filed is a financing statement which
is a simple notice that the secured party
and the debtor intend to deal with one
another with respect to the collateral
described in the financing statement. The
exact nature of their dealings in this col-
lateral is immaterial. In a sense the
filing gives the secured party a monopoly
on the described collateral while the
financing statement is effective. Any-
one else who tries to procure an interest
in this collateral while the filing is ef-
fective does so at his peril because he
has been forewarned that the secured
party has already "staked a claim" to
the collateral. To illustrate, let us sup-
pose that a secured party files a financing
statement covering equipment of the
debtor. Debtor signs a security agree-
ment granting a security interest in the
equipment and a loan is made. This
loan is paid off but no termination state-
ment is filed. A few months later debtor
borrows some more money from secured
party pursuant to a new security agree-
ment which again grants a security in-
terest in the same' equipment. No ad-
ditional filing is made. Before this loan
is paid off, debtor becomes bankrupt.
The security interest created by the
second security agreement is perfected
against the trustee in bankruptcy because
the single filing as to equipment protects
the secured party in all financing trans-
actions with the debtor involving this
equipment for a period of five years or
until a termination statement is filed.
See In re McCroskey, 4 UCC Rep. Serv.
237 (D.C. Ohio 1966). Now let's take
this kind of a case which raises the
question of the effect of future advances
under the notice filing concept. Lender
# 1 files a financing statement covering
equipment worth $10,000 and advances
$1,000 pursuant to a security agreement
with a provision for future advances.
Lender # 2 subsequently files a fi-
nancing statement covering the same
equipment and advances $6,000. Later
Lender # 1 advances an additional
$5,000. Because of the notice filing con-
cept, Lender # 1 should have priority
for his full exposure of $6,000 before
Lender # 2 gets anything. Lender # 1
had locked up the collateral for his bene-
fit by his filing. Precise amounts ad-
vanced by him and the timing of such
advances are immaterial. The notice
filing warned Lender # 2 that he was
dealing with the collateral at. his peril
and that his rights would be junior to
whatever rights Lender # 1 might have
under the first-to-file rule (Section 400.9-
312(5) (a)). The court in Coin-o-Matic
Service Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital
'Trust Co., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1112
(Sup. Ct. R.I. 1966) failed to appreciate
the significance of this concept and
reached what, to my mind, is an un-
fortunate result. One would hope this
case will not be followed elsewhere.
The Code has some rather explicit
provisions regarding what constitutes
the filing of a financing statement. And
these provisions can become important.
Suppose for example, you tender a fi-
nancing statement to the filing officer and
he refuses to accept it because it is his
"curbstone" opinion that the financing
stat inent is not properly drawn. Section
Journal of Missouri Bar
400.9-403(1) provides that "[p]resenta-
tion for filing of a financing statement
and tender of the filing fee . . . consti-
tutes filing" under Article 9. So if the
chips are down and it becomes impor-
tant to you, it should be possible to
establish the fact of filing even though
the filing officer has refused to accept
the financing statement. Compare In re
Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (D.C. Pa. 1962)
which seems to have been wrongly de-
cided in light of this Code provision.
Suppose the filing officer accepts your.
financing statement but fails to index it.
Have you filed? The answer seems to be
obvious from the provision in Section
400.9-403(1) that "acceptance of the
[financing] statement constitutes filing."
The contrary holding in In re Herron, 1
UCC Rep. Serv. 526 (D.C.. Pa. 1962)
is unfortunate.
Great care must be exercised in the
perfection of security interests in goods
which may become fixtures. Not the
least of our difficulties lies in recognizing
whether we have a fixture involved in
the transaction-a problem on which
the Code offers us no real assistance
(Section 400.9-313(1)). Take the case
of goods which are classified as business
equipment (as opposed to farm equip-
ment). If the equipment does not be-
come a fixture, a filing with the secretary
of state will be necessary. (Section 400.-
9-401(1)(c)). But if the equipment
becomes a fixture only a local filing is
necessary (Section 400.9-401(1) (b)).
Or assume we have a purchase money
security interest in consumer goods. If
the consumer goods do not become fix-
tures, no filing is necessary for we can
rely on automatic perfection (Section
400.9-302(1) (d)). But if they become
fixtures, a local filing will be necessary
(Section 400.9-401(1) (b)). When there
is doubt as to whether fixture financing
is involved, it seems sensible to cover
yourself both ways as to perfection .or
else you may be caught short. See In re
Park Corrugated Box Corp., 249 F. Supp.
56 (D.C. N.J. 1966); In re Collier, 3
UCC Rep.. Serv. 1076 (D.C. Tenn.
1966); In re Keystone Baking Co., 1
UCC Rep. Serv. 606 (D.C. Pa. 1958).
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Priorities of Security Interests
Trustee in bankruptcy. In discussing
the priorities of security interests in the
bankruptcy context, I want to look at
the trustee's powers under. Sections '70
and 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Let's look first at the trustee's powers
under Section 70(c) which contains the
so-called "strong arm" clause. This gives
the trustee the powers of a hypothetical-
ly perfect lien creditor as of the date of
bankruptcy as- to property of the bank-
rupt. Assume that we have an unper-
fected security interest in collateral of
the debtor at the time of bankruptcy. On
the date of bankruptcy the trustee has
the powers of a lien creditor as to this
collateral and, as such, he will prevail
over the unperfected security interest
(Section 400.9-301(1)(b)). See In re
Hall, 248 F. Supp. 124 (D.C. 1965). But
if the security interest is perfected (in-
cluding automatic perfection) before the
date of bankruptcy, the perfected securi-
ty interest will have priority over the
trustee as a subsequent lien creditor
(Section 400.9-301(1)(b)). See In re
Lucacos, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 553 (D.C.
Pa. 1957).
Under Section 70(e) the trustee is
empowered to exercise for the benefit
of the bankrupt estate the actual rights
of any general creditors having provable
claims. Prior to the Code this power of
the trustee created serious problems in a
number of states where it was held that
an unreasonable delay in recording of a
chattel mortgage, for example, rendered
the mortgage lien void as to a general
creditor who intervened between the time
the mortgage was executed and the time
it was recorded. Where such doctrine pre-
vailed, the trustee could step into the
shoes of the interim general creditor
under Section,70(e) and strike down
the mortgage lien for the benefit of the
bankrupt estate. This should no longer
be possible under the Code as is indi-
cated by the well reasoned opinion in
In re Weeks, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 870
-(D.C. Mich. 1964); aff'd 2 UCC Rep.
Serv. 877 (D.C. Mich. 1965).
Under Section 60 the trustee is em-
powered to void preferential transfers
as defined in that section. For our pur-
poses the critical elements of a prefer-
ential transfer are that it must be a trans-
fer of the bankrupt's property which is'
made within four months of bankruptcy
for an antecedent debt. The granting of
a security interest by the debtor is a
transfer under Section 60. Such a trans-
fer is deemed to have been made under
Section 60 when the security interest
is perfected against lien creditors. If the
perfection occurs within four months of
bankruptcy for an antecedent debt, we
have the makings of a voidable preference.
For example, assume that on 2/1/67 a
secured party lends money to debtor
pursuant to a security agreement granting
a security interest in collateral. However,
secured party does not file a financing
statement until 8/1/67. Debtor becomes
bankrupt on 8/15/67. In this example
the security interest attached (Section
400.9-204) on 2/1/67 but it was not per-
fected (Section 400.9-303) until 8/1/67.
So under Section 60 we have a transfer
(perfection) within four months of
bankruptcy for an antecedent debt
(since value was given back on 2/1/67)
and we are on the road to a voidable
preference. This example illustrates the
so-called "pocket lien" practice at which
Section 60 was directed. Observe that
by employing this technique the se-
cured party has attached a security in-
terest to the bankrupt's property but has
kept this fact a secret from other credi-
tors until he filed shortly before bank-
ruptcy in a last minute effort to protect
himself at the expense of other credi-
tors. Such practice is clearly condemned
by Section 60 and the "Johnny come late-
ly" perfection of the security interest
should be voidable.-See In re Jeavons, 2
UCC Rep. Serv. 644 (D.C. Ohio 1965).
Now we come to the problem on
which so much erudition has been ex-
pended and so much ink spilled-the
voidable preference problem in the con-
text of the floating lien under the Code.
Assume that on 2/1/67 secured party
lends $50,000 to debtor under the terms
of security agreement which grants a
security interest in all of debtor's in-
ventory which is now owned or here-
after acquired. Assume also that secured
party has filed a financing statement
covering this transaction at the outset.
When the transaction is initiated on
2/1/67 secured party has a perfected
security interest in debtor's existing in-
ventory. Now let's assume that on the
first day of each succeeding month from
March to August the debtor acquires
additional inventory and then debtor be-
comes bankrupt on 8/15/67. Can a
preferential transfer be established as to
the after-acquired inventory which came
into the debtor's hands within four
months of bankruptcy? To lay the basis
for a case of preferential transfer the
writers have argued that the security
interest in after-acquired inventory can-
not attach (Section 400.9-204) until it
is acquired by the debtor and perfection
cannot take place under the filing until
such attachment occurs (Section 400.9-
303). So, the writers say, we have a
series of transfers of the debtor/bank-
rupt's property occurring each month as
the secured party's security interest at-
tached and became perfected as to the
after-acquired property. So far so good.
The writers then conclude that the
transfers of security interests in after-
acquired inventory which occurred
within four months of bankruptcy must
be for an antecedent debt since the se-
cured party advanced the $50,000 to
the debtor way back in February. Here
I must part company with them. To my
mind the need for true floating lien
financing is an economic fact of life. Its
legitimate use should be protected from
a crippling application of Section 60.
In other words Section 60 should be
applied to the floating lien transaction
only if the Bankruptcy Act clearly makes
such application inevitable and in-
escapable. I find nothing in the Bank-
ruptcy Act which leads inexorably to
the application of Section 60 to floating
lien financing. Consider the legislative
history of Section 60. It was directed
essentially at the unfairness typified by
the pocket lien transaction. But the
floating lien transaction is not pocket
lien stuff. From the start of the floating
lien transaction there is full and fair
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disclosure of what is happening through
the filing of a financing statement. So it
seems fair to say that Section 60 was
not directed at legitimate transactions of
this type. And there seems to be nothing
in the language of Section 60 which
requires its application to ,the floating
lien transaction. The term "antecedent
debt" is not defined in the Bankruptcy
Act thus leaving it open to our courts
to construe this term in a manner which
is consonant with the policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and with the needs of the
business community for floating lien
financing. A construction of this term
along the lines suggested by Section
400.9-108 seems appropriate and per-
missible to serve these ends without
violating the policy of the Bankruptcy
Act. Fortunately the two cases which
have considered the problem to date
indicate that our courts are sympathetic
to the need for floating lien financing
and feel it can be accommodated under
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. In re
Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 4
UCC Rep. Serv. 533 (D.C. Ore. 1967)
reversing 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 194 (D.C.
Ore. 1966); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262
F. Supp. 635 (D.C. Mass. 1967). For
those who are still leery of the problem,
it can be avoided by some careful struc-
turing and policing of the floating lien
transaction. For example, if the monies
received from the sale of inventory by
the debtor are earmarked as proceeds
of the inventory and these monies are
then used to purchase additional inven-
tory, the after-acquired inventory be-
comes proceeds of the proceeds of the
original inventory (Section 400.9-306
(1)) and the perfection of the original
inventory continues into the after-ac-
quired inventory as proceeds withont
interruption (Section 400.9-306(3) (a))
thus avoiding the Section 60 preference
problem. See Howarth v. Universal C.T.T.
Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (D.C. Pa.
1962).
Bona fide purchasers. The Code pro-
vides that a perfected security interest
takes priority over a bona fide purchaser
(Section 400.9-301 (1) (c)). Prime Busi-
ness Co. v. Drinkwater, 350 Mass. 642,
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• 216 NE 2d 105- (1966). This rule ap-
plies where the secured party is relying
on automatic perfection of a purchase
money security interest in farm equip-
ment or consumer goods (Section 400.9-
302(1) (c) and (d)) unless the good
faith purchaser is a consumer or a
farmer (Section 400.9-307(2)). Nation-
al Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Vera,
223 NE 2d 515 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1967)
involves an interesting situation in which
a lien creditor who had levied on
consumer goods subject to an auto-
matically perfected purchase money se-
curity interest put the goods up for sale
and then purchased them at the execu-
tion sale. When the secured party found
out what was going on, it sued the lien
creditor for conversion claiming priority
under Section 400.9-301(1)(b). Lien
creditor countered with the argument
that he was now in the position of a
consumer who had purchased the goods
in good faith and was protected by Sec-
tion 400.9-30p7(2). The court properly
held that the lien creditor could not
bootstrap himself into a position of pri-
ority in this way.
Buyers in ordinary course of bushess.
Except for farm products, the buyer in
ordinary course of business takes free
of a perfected security interest (Section
400.9-307(1)). Sterling Acceptance Co.
v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.
2d 600 (1961). Most of the problems in
this area to date seem to center around
the question of when a buyer can quali-
fy as a "buyer in ordinary course of
business" (Section 400.1-201 (9)). Can
a dealer who buys' in ordinary course
from another dealer qualify? Can he
qualify even though he knows of the
existence of the security interest in the
inventory when he buys? The court
answers both of these questions in the
affirmative in Main Investment Co. v.
Gisolfi, 203 Pa. Super. 244, 119 A.2d
535 (1964). But a dealer who not only
knows of the security interest but also
knows that sale of the goods to him is
b forbidden under the terms of the security
agreement cannot qualify as a buyer in
ordinary course of business. 0. M. Scott
Credit Corp. v. Apex, Inc., 97 R.I. 442,
198 A.2d 673 (1964). Nor can one
who does not give new value qualify.
Evans Products Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.
2d 978 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1966).
Under Section 400.9-307(1), the buy-
er of farm products in ordinary course of
business is not protected against a per-
fected security interest in the farm prod-
ucts. But Clovis Natl. Bank v. Thomas,
77 N.M. 554, 425 P. 2d 726 (1967)
indicates that a court which does not
like this rule can easily side-step it unless
the secured party has carefully structured
and policed the secured transaction.
First-to-file or first-to-perfect. When
both security interests are perfected by
filing, the first-to-file takes priority (Sec-
tion 400.9-312(5) (a)). This rule oper-
ates even though the secured party who
filed first had knowledge of the com-
peting security interest when he filed.
In re Gunderson, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 358
(D.C. Ill. 1967). In French Lumber Co.
v. Commercial Realty & Finance Co.,
346 Mass. 716, 195 N.E. 2d 507 (1964),
a secured party who refinanced an ob-
ligation and could easily have had the
benefit of the first-to-file rule had he
taken an assignment of the rights of the
original secured party was saved by the
court through doctrines of subrogation.
Lonoke Production Credit Assn. v.
Bohannon, 238 Ark. 206, 379 S.E. 2d
17 (1964), is a good illustration of the
operation of the first-to-perfect rule
where one security interest is perfected
automatically and another is perfected
by filing (Section 400.9-312(5)(b)).
Fixtures. An unperfected security in-
terest which attaches to goods before they
are affixed to the realty as fixtures takes
priority over prior-real estate interests
(Section 400.9-313). In re Royers Bak-
ery, Inc., 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 570 (D.C.
Pa. 1963). Unfortunately the court
seems to have overlooked the applicabili-
ty of this rule to the situation in U.S. v.
Baptist Golden Age Home, 266 F. Supp.
892 (D.C. Ark. 1964).
Accessions. The priority rules as to
accessions are similar to those for fixtures
(Section 400.9-314). If the security in-
terest attaches to goods before they are
affixed as accessions to the whole, the
security interest, though unperfected,
takes priority over existing interests in
the whole. The problem of priority of
interests in accessions to aircraft was
discussed in International Atlas, Inc. v.
Twentieth Century Aircraft Company,
251 Cal. App. 2d 495, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495
(Ct. App. Cal. 1967). The court un-
fortunately suggests in this case that
the priority provisions of the Code re-
lating to accessions are not. applicable
because the federal law relating to se-
curity interests in aircraft has preempted
the' field (cf. Section 9-104(a)).
Proceeds. Before we can handle prior-
ity problems relating to proceeds we
must be able to identify items which are
proceeds under the definition of Section
400.9-306(1). There can be borderline
situations where the question is not an
easy one. For example, in Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Invest-
ment Corp., 222 A. 2d 571 (Sup. Ct. R.I.
1966) the court, in a close case influ-
enced no doubt by the peculiar facts in-
volved, decided that insurance money
paid on an insurance policy covering
casualty to the collateral 'was not pro-
ceeds under the Code definition. In
Hoffman v. Snack, 2 UCC Rep. Serv.
862 (Com. P1. Pa. 1964), it was held
that debtor's claim for damages against
a third party for tortious destruction of
the collateral Was not proceeds.
Assuming we have proceeds involved,
it is important that the secured party
assure himself of a continuously per-
fected security interest flowing from the
original collateral into the proceeds. This
normally can be accomplished by filing
a financing statement which claims pro-
ceeds (Sections 400.9-402 and 400.9-
306(3) (a)). In re Platt, 257 F. Supp.
478 (D.C. Pa. 1966) indicates the dif-
ficulties which can be encountered when
one fails to claim proceeds in the fi-
nancing statement.
If a perfected security interest is prop-
erly maintained in proceeds, the general
rule of thumb is that the secured party
should have the same priorities in the
proceeds as he would have had in the
original collateral. Girard Trust Corn Ex-
change Bank v. Warren Lepke Ford,
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Inc., 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 531 (Com. P1.
Pa. 1958) well illustrates the wonders
which can be worked prioritywise
through a perfected security interest in
proceeds. See also, Rodi Boat Co. v.
Provident tradesman's Bank &'Trust
Co., 339 F. 2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1964)
where the court, without reference to
the proceeds provisions of the Code,
reaches an appropriate result through
the application of common law proceeds
principles and the constructive trust de-
vice.
The special priority rule governing
chattel paper which is proceeds of the
sale of inventory subject to a perfected
security interest (Section 400.9-308)
was applied in Associates Discount Corp.
v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 220
A. 2d 621 (1966).
Default Procedures
While the Code permits self-help
repossession of collateral after default
(Section 400.9-503), a little care and
caution is indicated in the exercise of
this right. In Beggs v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 409 S.W. 2d 719 (Sup.
Ct. Mo. .1966) the secured party was
stuck with $7,500 in punitive damages
because it had repossessed the wrong
truck.
Several cases have raised the question
of what constitutes effective notice of
resale after repossession. Baber v. Wil-
liam Ford Co., 239 Ark. 1054, 396 S.W.
2d 302 (1965); Mallicoat v. Volunteer
Finance & Loan Corp., 4 UCC Rep.
Serv. 49 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1967). These
cases indicate to me the desirability of
including in the security agreement pro-
visions which describe the techniques of
giving iaotice of resale so that this type
of litigation can be avoided.
First Nat. Bank of Glendale v. Sheriff,
34 Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W. 2d 548
(1967) raised an interesting question
with which you could be faced. A judg-
ment creditor caused the sheriff to levy
on goods which were subject to a per-
fected security interest. The secured
party sought to replevy the goods from
the sheriff despite the fact that the debt-
or was not in default under the terms
of the security agreement. The court re-
fused to permit replevin- because with-
out default under the security agree-
ment, the secured party was -not en-
titled to possession of the goods. As the
court points out, Section 400.9-311 rec-
ognizes that there can be an involuntary
transfer of collateral by judicial process
and the goods would have to be sold
at the execution sale subject to the per-
fected security interest of the secured
party which should be ample protection
to him. Doesn't this case indicate the
usefulness of the common provision
found in security agreements that at-
tachment, levy, etc., on the goods shall
constitute an act of default? Had there
been default in this case, secured party
would have been entitled to possession
and the replevin action should have
been successful. 0
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